Shine《光能》雜志2011年12月刊封面報道：施正榮——不妥協(xié)的老大

在這篇文章的開頭，我要申明一點，這也許是第一次沒有將注意力集中在一家企業(yè)的競爭力而是放在了企業(yè)領導人身上，這并非是一篇傾向性的報道，而實在是施正榮所代表的,已經(jīng)超出了尚德本身。

相信很多人知道“光伏”這個詞是因為施正榮，從對2005年中國首富的關注，到對這個行業(yè)的好奇，再到投身于這個行業(yè)，6年的時間，無數(shù)的資本和懷揣夢想的淘金者跨入這個行業(yè)，潮起潮落間，施正榮一直站在風口浪尖。

很多人和企業(yè)與筆者一樣，都是從其它兄弟行業(yè)轉入光伏。記得在2006年初，中國政府從“資源換美元”中如夢初醒，開始打壓污染耗能行業(yè)，筆者所從事金屬硅行業(yè)也由于上不起環(huán)保設備的小企業(yè)眾多，行業(yè)陷入停滯狀態(tài)，那時一噸加工粗糙的金屬硅售價1000美元（當時美元匯率大概是8.3），只能賺300-500元人民幣。為了讓讀者更方便理解這個利潤率的概念，筆者舉個例子：經(jīng)常有企業(yè)在接到訂單后出貨時，發(fā)現(xiàn)海運費或是匯率稍微浮動一點，最后利潤為零甚至是負數(shù)，所以筆者在08年看到企業(yè)不計成本的一批批空運組件時才會瞠目結舌。

淘汰高污染高耗能的行業(yè)是大勢所趨，因此筆者在當時也尋求個人的職業(yè)轉型，這時尚德已經(jīng)在西方一片狂歡聲中上市， 施也在圣誕節(jié)前后以186億的資產(chǎn)成為中國首富。但他真正被國人熟知卻是在2006年初，在簽約鳥巢項目后，媒體給予了更多的關注。筆者也是在這個時候看到了每公斤1美元的金屬硅賣到國外提純?yōu)槎嗑Ч韬螅?00美元的價格被國人買回來，在被刺痛的同時也看到了關于尚德和施正榮的相關報道，當然，那時誰也不會想到在08年三季度，多晶硅的現(xiàn)貨價格已經(jīng)漲到了近500美元/公斤。

耀眼的布道者

那個時候，大眾媒體總是喜歡追朔施的身世，大家也樂于看到一個草根英雄的崛起，所以少時窮困，青年留學，不惑創(chuàng)業(yè)的施正榮成為“知識改變命運”的代表，典型的海歸技術英雄。

可以說，中國光伏能有現(xiàn)在的局面，施正榮功不可沒，業(yè)內(nèi)至少70%的企業(yè)是跟著尚德的足跡踩進了這個行業(yè)。如果覺得這個數(shù)字夸張，那么去數(shù)一下現(xiàn)在中國的光伏企業(yè)有多少是在2005年后成立或者開始涉足光伏領域的就知道了。

第一次見到施正榮，是在上海的第二屆SNEC展會上，尚德給這家展覽公司提供了很大支持。開幕儀式結束后，施和幾位光伏屆的專家被眾星拱月般的媒體團團圍住，那時的施正榮給人的感覺是鋒芒畢露，光彩照人，這是尚德最強盛的時刻。此時強如英利、天合，在尚德和施正榮的強大氣場下，也只是紅花邊上的一朵綠葉。

招風的大樹

施正榮一直以行業(yè)老大自詡，從言談上給人的感覺也是舍我其誰的感覺，對于中國光伏業(yè)，他確實做了很多，包括但不限于尚德的成功模式帶動的中國投資狂潮。

SolarWorld和美國鋼鐵工人協(xié)會發(fā)動了各種反傾銷，尤其是SolarWorld，從德國追到美國，對此施正榮在2009年赴歐希冀解決爭端，在美國“301”法案推出時也四處呼吁。

中國人好大喜功的惡習被美國人當真了，光伏企業(yè)獲得的銀行授信被中國企業(yè)有意無意、國外企業(yè)別有用心的當做貸款來看，美方將這點在新一輪的反傾銷調(diào)查中夸大其詞。對于這些控訴，施正榮表示“光伏產(chǎn)業(yè)需要一個統(tǒng)一的市場機制，也包括貿(mào)易爭議的解決機制。”

實際上尚德是唯一一個有機會讓中國光伏行業(yè)出現(xiàn)統(tǒng)一聲音的企業(yè)，從施正榮的言談中也可以透露出他也致力于同行之間的互相合作，但時至今日，中國光伏仍然如沙雕的城堡一般，看似龐大壯麗，實則不堪一擊。雖不能責怪尚德的不作為，但終究讓人扼腕。究其原因，在于施正榮的性格所致，但我們細細分析，卻又不能將問題歸結到施正榮和尚德的頭上。

筆者曾將光伏行業(yè)形容為一桌麻將，政府、國企、大企業(yè)和小企業(yè)的四方博弈，在這個賭桌上，國企的賭資是由政府提供的，而政府和大企業(yè)又暗通款曲，所以小企業(yè)處于孤立無援的狀態(tài)，這也是國內(nèi)普遍存在的現(xiàn)象。從乳制品行業(yè)強制上檢測設備就可以看出，最后倒下的反而是那些沒出過什么問題的小企業(yè)。

同時幾乎所有的政策、標準都是向著大企業(yè)傾斜的，所以小企業(yè)很少愿意參與協(xié)會等行業(yè)機構，所以在中國開會，上面坐著的永遠是那幾家大企業(yè)的負責人或高管。因此在今年德國漢堡和美國達拉斯展上，一家小企業(yè)接連爆出“1美元/瓦”和“0.89美元/瓦”的超低價，筆者在觀察后，發(fā)現(xiàn)該展位幾乎無人問津，但市場價格卻被整體拉低了。

我們回頭看看國內(nèi)大廠，如果大廠間能夠達成協(xié)作共贏的模式，中國光伏的發(fā)展也會順利許多，畢竟如果能夠多賺些，沒人愿意背負“低價傾銷”的惡名。但尚德在此卻沒能成功的收服各路諸侯，換言之，現(xiàn)在的尚德，只不過是拳頭最大罷了。這是為什么？

逐鹿的鹿

如果把光伏市場競爭比作群雄逐鹿，那么尚德則扮演著雙重角色，既是最大的諸侯，偶爾也客串下“鹿”的角色。這樣的關系，讓尚德與同行間的關系一度緊張。

在尚德上市后，尚德積累了數(shù)年的技術人員在新晉廠商中無疑是一座座移動著的人型金礦，但以尚德一家企業(yè)是無法將這些金礦全部挖掘并打造成首飾的，因此一段時期內(nèi)，無論是尚德的員工還是管理層都成了獵頭公司的目標。

與經(jīng)常與尚德相提并論的英利不同，英利地處北方，處于一家獨大的狀態(tài)，附近并無同級別競爭對手，許多員工在安家后就不愿去外地工作，而且北方人的戀家情結也較為嚴重；尚德所在的江蘇省則群雄并起，員工去其它單位工作很方便，同時南方人更愿意為賺錢多付出努力。更重要的是，英利走的是貼近國企模式的路線，這樣給中國人更多的歸屬感；尚德在這方面則是力圖打造國際化的團隊，更好的適應光伏行業(yè)高度國際化的特點，但這也讓員工流動性也高度“國際化”。一個很好的例子可以證明這點：英利在金融危機和現(xiàn)在的市場低谷時，都喊出了“不降薪，不裁員”的口號，而尚德則變相裁員來化解危機。

這些年陸續(xù)從尚德被其它企業(yè)挖走或離職的高管有：

楊懷進，與施同樣從澳洲留學，并與其回國創(chuàng)業(yè)，后陸續(xù)于南京中電（中電光伏前身）、晶澳太陽能任職，后任海潤光伏CEO，幫助海潤成功上市。

張鳳鳴、泰德，施正榮在澳洲的同事，陸續(xù)離職后與楊懷進一起進入中電光伏，與趙建華夫婦共事，張鳳鳴現(xiàn)任天威首席技術官，泰德在臺創(chuàng)立旭泓全球光電。

王漢飛，尚德第一名職業(yè)經(jīng)理人，當時尚德科研人員齊備，政府關系由無錫政府給予支持，前董事長李延人出面打理，王漢飛作為施正榮的助手，做了大量工作。后受林洋（韓華新能源前身）老板陸永華邀請，2004年年中離開尚德，助林洋在美國納斯達克上市。可惜由于積勞成疾，2008年7月在睡夢中英年早逝。他的去世讓陸永華悲痛萬分，在光伏行業(yè)的心氣也低了許多，后低調(diào)分兩次轉讓全部股權。

邵華千，從創(chuàng)業(yè)初期的施正榮秘書做到副總裁，她的離去讓施正榮頗為惋惜。

陳立志，于尚德工作5年，后出任尚德美國公司副總裁，負責美洲業(yè)務拓展，在今年7月閃電離職。

張怡，尚德CFO，于今年離職。

至于中層和一線操作工人，流失情況更為嚴重，這也造成了尚德與各家企業(yè)間的矛盾雖未擺在明面上，但卻一直存在。

正如一個硬幣的兩面，尚德員工離職也并非全部來自外部的招攬。

施正榮與天合CEO高紀凡同樣推崇走國際化路線，他們會經(jīng)常強調(diào)尚德或天合都不只是一個中國公司，而應該看作一個國際化的公司（而事實也確實如此，上市的中國光伏企業(yè)中，中國人的股權只占一小部分，而施又要算是澳籍）。他們都醉心于打造一個國際化的團隊，所以在天合和尚德隨處可見外籍員工擔任管理和對外事務的工作。

施正榮、高紀凡等人為中國光伏業(yè)每一次政策實施和調(diào)整功不可沒，而且成功的讓中國政府重視光伏行業(yè)對于節(jié)能減排的意義，中國光伏發(fā)展計劃從無到有，直至現(xiàn)在的2020年50GW的發(fā)展目標，他們一次次的游說，并邀請政府官員到廠參觀，證明光伏是清潔的、能夠幫助中國進行產(chǎn)業(yè)轉型的新興產(chǎn)業(yè)。中國的光伏行業(yè)到今年能夠啟動，施和高可以說是最大功臣。

但尚德和天合對于國內(nèi)市場的態(tài)度都可以歸納為“關注但不投入”，兩家對中國市場的關注度與國外市場相差甚遠，對于市場方面，兩家均傾向于走上層路線：與政府打好關系，等利好政策出臺時自然分到一杯羹。

但如果要進一步打開國際市場，施正榮需要更加國際化的團隊。在路透社網(wǎng)站公布的尚德高管列表中，首席財務官David來自美國博克德（BECHTEL）公司，上一份工作是在Tetra tech公司；John Lefebvre于9月26日任美國公司總裁，曾在SolarCity和GE工作；Andrew Beebe，首席商務官，畢業(yè)于美國最知名常青藤大學之一——達特茅斯。其余各位高管除謝曉南擁有無錫政府背景外，也均來自國際知名公司和新南威爾士大學。

大批的空降部隊帶來了讓尚德在國際市場暢通無阻，但也帶來新的問題：如何在老員工和“空降兵”之間一碗水端平？施正榮曾說：“我能用中國人肯定用中國人，但尚德面對的是歐美市場的客戶，又不是中國的煤礦區(qū)。”但他在一心憧憬著將尚德國際化之時，卻似乎忽略了這些“煤礦工人”掌握著尚德的科研、財務、客戶和政府關系等方方面面。當了解中國，懂得中國管理模式的“煤礦工人”離職后，尚德的制度、理念傳達很容易在中間層形成真空地帶。有件事情是可以參考的，尚德今年頒發(fā)給設備實驗室經(jīng)理劉懷林100萬元大獎，說明施正榮對科技進步的重視，但里面有個細節(jié)：劉懷林為了保證公司產(chǎn)品安全，把房子抵押給銀行獲得80萬元的貸款，之后研發(fā)工作才得以進行。以施正榮對研發(fā)工作的專注，劉懷林為何不向上申報科研經(jīng)費？

而且“空投部隊”之前是“空軍”，現(xiàn)在成為“陸軍”后如何把心態(tài)調(diào)整過來，對尚德是否有那么深厚的感情都是未知數(shù)，之前尚德2006-2007年間高薪聘請的來自BP、西門子、普華永道等企業(yè)的中高層員工已經(jīng)離職過半。

這其中體現(xiàn)了施正榮矛盾的心態(tài)，一方面，他希望尚德能夠永遠保持那種爆發(fā)式的增長，另一方面也希望老員工能夠跟上他的國際化進程，但即使是施正榮本人，在管理上面也會犯錯誤，這個問題不是尚德獨有，而是行業(yè)發(fā)展得過快，從幾十MW的小廠到中國首富，再到金融危機和2010年的市場爆發(fā)，加上大家都想到會出現(xiàn)但沒想到這么嚴重的行業(yè)低谷，光伏行業(yè)的陷阱和機遇一樣多。專業(yè)分析機構Solarbuzz的高級分析師廉銳博士也說：“這個行業(yè)的不確定性太大，所以也請大家對我們預測的偏差給予理解。”施正榮也意識到這個問題，對媒體稱在物色一個CEO，但這談何容易？

不妥協(xié)的老大

施正榮的“老大”情結是業(yè)內(nèi)公認的，當然，這一路走來，也只有尚德具備這個資格稱為老大。但他卻沒能成為教父這樣的角色，而更像是教父性格火爆、熱愛家庭的長子桑尼。

在尚德上市的艱難過程中，國企背景過重是在美上市的一大阻礙，施正榮為此不惜與前董事長李延人矛盾激化，最后在無錫政府的幫助下，讓小天鵝等原始股東退出，李延人黯然離職，這使無錫工商界對施正榮頗多微詞。雖然不是當事人，無意對此做出評價，但冷靜下來想想，不如此，尚德還能夠成為現(xiàn)在的尚德么？

在行業(yè)快速發(fā)展時，施正榮警告行業(yè)會出現(xiàn)過剩，大多數(shù)人認為這是其想嚇退競爭對手而無人領情；在英利爆出“6毛9”的超低價時，他數(shù)次在近千人的會議上嘲諷此事，雖然這件事的是非功過很難評說，而且據(jù)了解這是英利給國投電力的價格，是否國電報錯也有待證實，但以施的身份，這些言辭只是折了他的氣度。

從這幾年的觀察，施正榮的性格可以總結為：一個直率而有些莽撞、不妥協(xié)的理想主義者。

正是這樣的性格，也讓施正榮雖然一直在呼吁行業(yè)自律，但卻應者寥寥。他自己也承認：”我們一定要避免一種觀念：把對手整死我才能活好。這種想法很幼稚，你不可能把別人整死。現(xiàn)在，這個行業(yè)不斷有新進入者進來，我的建議是：要理性地分析產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展趨勢和自己的競爭優(yōu)勢。“本應作為行業(yè)仲裁者的尚德，卻經(jīng)常在看到不滿的事情后就拿起武器沖在最前面，這讓他四處樹敵。

業(yè)內(nèi)流傳著這樣的一個事情：施正榮曾有意當選某新能源協(xié)會會長一職，但由于有人稱其是澳籍，不符合規(guī)定，最后受阻。

施正榮也被看成是業(yè)內(nèi)最著名的毒舌之一，原因在于：他經(jīng)常會說些包括市場悲觀預期和對業(yè)內(nèi)一些現(xiàn)象的批評，他自稱會經(jīng)常發(fā)表些不成熟的預言。但不幸的是，這些年的歷史證明，他大部分的話是對的。

“光伏行業(yè)存在泡沫，一個是財富效應，第二是地方政府推波助瀾。”2007年提出，無人相信。

“沒有市場，怎么有工廠！”質疑地方政府爭相將光伏業(yè)列為重點產(chǎn)業(yè)。

“薄膜太陽能絕對是泡沫，要分析都是誰在炒薄膜概念?這里面有行業(yè)領袖和行業(yè)專家嗎?”2009年施正榮評薄膜時惹眾薄膜廠家怒。

“不論什么行業(yè)，只要中國人進入，產(chǎn)能立馬上去。不注重品牌和商業(yè)模式建設，最后只能‘國人喝湯，洋人吃肉’。”2009年的預測，到現(xiàn)在可以說要實現(xiàn)了，現(xiàn)在乃至未來，上游環(huán)節(jié)都將維持在極低的利潤率。

“歐洲需求下降，明年全球光伏市場將肯定出現(xiàn)過剩。”發(fā)布于2010年11月。

“光伏產(chǎn)業(yè)還未成形，今天的世界第幾，明天可能什么都不是。”

“明后兩年將會比較難過”，我們必須熬過這兩年冬天。”—— 他預計明年太陽能電池板的庫存水平將高達11GW。

他同樣有很多能引起業(yè)內(nèi)共鳴的語言。比如“大膽”預測今年中國市場將有1.5GW的容量，但他也說沒想到竟然達到了3個GW；預測電價達到一塊錢一度，現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)成為現(xiàn)實。尚未得到驗證的是他說2015年中國肯定是全球最大市場，年容量8GW-10GW，美國6個GW左右，中、美、印將成為最大的光伏市場。

他會說些大家都在說的如何度過行業(yè)危機，避免惡意競爭、建立行業(yè)制度等，他更會說些大家不會說的，如對于之前國內(nèi)政策進展緩慢的失望，一些官員和政府部門的不作為，這相比一些四平八穩(wěn)的企業(yè)老總，他實在是個異數(shù)。

作為一個媒體人，一個旁觀者，尚德前幾年中國的品牌營銷可以說不甚成功，對于施的過度神話讓人反感，覺得不切實際，相比商業(yè)奇才，我更愿把施正榮看成一個科技致富的英雄，一個為環(huán)保、為發(fā)展太陽能不遺余力的帶理想主義色彩和以行業(yè)發(fā)展為己任的商人（他在對大眾傳播光伏應用上，可以說做了極大貢獻），他自己也承認，會迷惑，會犯錯誤，何苦將其包裝成一個完人？

在英利贊助世界杯后，同樣贊助過珠峰等體育運動的尚德對其表示不看好。更有甚者，某位寫手將英利的“英雄的勝利”解釋為“蠅頭小利”，讓人啞然，雖然這應該不是出自施正榮的意愿，但進一步敗壞了尚德的形象，這點英利做的比較含蓄，只是在反擊的文章中讓讀者自行比較優(yōu)劣，之所以這么說的原因在于那些文章中施正榮的信息很容易搜集，但能夠獲得一向低調(diào)的英利CEO苗連生如此詳細的信息，非內(nèi)部人員不可。

這種情況在施任命張建敏為媒體關系經(jīng)理后大為改善，現(xiàn)在的尚德，以一種更為寬厚的目光來看待同業(yè)間的事件、摩擦，也為尚德贏得了更多的尊重。

直面錯誤

在9月底舉行的尚德十周年慶典上，一向精神抖擻的施正榮卻顯得有些疲憊，結構調(diào)整，戰(zhàn)略布局和很多的負面消息讓他休息不夠。他說：“過去十年我們有很多光環(huán)，有很多輝煌，因為我們是老大，我們也付出了很多老大的代價，我們也做了很多探索，在探索有成功也有失敗，為后來者、為第二、第三位提供了很多可借鑒的經(jīng)驗。在此同時我們也受到很多質疑，你做老大就要做到很好，我們有時候也不一定能做好很好，所以媒體的朋友對我寬容一點。”這為他贏得了熱烈的掌聲，因為這在以前，是不曾有過的。給筆者的感覺是他終于從神化的光環(huán)中走出來，多了些反思和總結。雖然他的演講仍然屢次強調(diào)尚德的領導地位，但卻讓人會心一笑而不反感，不如此，他就不是施正榮了。

雖然施正榮承認犯過一些錯誤，但有些錯誤筆者認為并不能歸咎于他，之前沸沸揚揚的“詐捐”事件冷靜分析下，尚德的操作手法是否正確雖然存疑，但商人的投入總是要回報的，在做好事的同時追求利益最大化無可厚非。

同樣讓尚德顯得有些狼狽的與MEMC終止合約一事，也是非戰(zhàn)之罪。除天合CEO高紀凡在2008上半年有所警覺而壯士斷腕，棄已投資千萬的多晶硅項目之外，行業(yè)內(nèi)幾乎無人嗅到金融危機的風險。包括Q-cells、CSI和南京中電等企業(yè)，也都與多晶硅企業(yè)簽訂了長單。此次解除供應，讓尚德從長遠角度看，擺脫了身上的枷鎖，當年MEMC在簽訂十年供貨協(xié)議時，還順帶要了尚德的股份，這次雙方“分手”，一方面應該是MEMC不肯議價，另一方面是尚德有意涉足硅片環(huán)節(jié)以進一步降低成本。”2006年我們與它簽合同的時候，原材料的價格比市場便宜20%-30%，但后來我們看到原材料的趨勢在往下走，如果我們把這份合同執(zhí)行下去，要比現(xiàn)貨價虧損4個多億美金。于是我們與MEMC公司商量停止執(zhí)行合同，我們給它一些補償。由于我們5年前已經(jīng)預付款5700萬美金，對方同意我們再付6000多萬美金就結束合同。總計我們要付出1.1億美金，但可以節(jié)省4億美金。“

今年3月，尚德電力以1.3億美元的高價，收購了硅片制造企業(yè)榮德新能源。榮德新能源前身為輝煌硅能源(也是尚德電力的硅片供應商)。根據(jù)尚德的公司規(guī)劃，榮德新能源計劃總投資10億美元，在2011年上半年形成單晶硅和多晶硅總計1.23G W的產(chǎn)能，到2011年的年尾組件產(chǎn)能要達到2.4GW，切片產(chǎn)能達到1.2GW，也可以這樣說，自產(chǎn)切片一直都保持在一半的供應產(chǎn)量上。榮德新能源最終將形成3GW的產(chǎn)能數(shù)量。

個人認為施的真正錯誤在于投資薄膜電池。在唱衰薄膜短期前景后，施正榮又忍不住上薄膜項目，這可以歸結為他對薄膜技術的感情：做了一輩子薄膜，總想做點突破，而且做慣老大的尚德也難以忍受在可能成為未來主流的技術上落后。

從2007年5月到2011年初，浪費了大量的時間和財力，該項目最終被放棄。做為一個一直從事薄膜研究，至今喜歡被人稱作施博士的科學家和一個成功的商人，如果說分析不出該項目的可行性是令人難以置信的。比較有說服力的是這個理想主義者仍然對老本行念念不忘，即使存在風險，他也要去冒險賭一賭。“我是個理想主義者，今年已年過半百，還有理想。”施正榮說做為一個探索者，尚德還會保持這種敢于犯錯的勇氣，給后來者避免犯錯，避免曲折的機會。

“中國企業(yè)還是要花更多時間，并且實實在在地把銷售收入中的5%或者8%放在研發(fā)上，那么5年以后中國再出現(xiàn)一個被市場認可的First Solar是可能的。”可惜，現(xiàn)在的光伏市場生存壓力過大，留給研發(fā)的空間越來越小了，像First Solar那樣埋頭研究10年后一鳴驚人的情況已不可復制。

媒體經(jīng)常拿施正榮和英利的CEO苗連生做比較，反差極大的兩人代表著中外企業(yè)思潮的碰撞。在平穩(wěn)渡過金融危機、提前預知并應對市場寒冬這些方面，苗連生比施正榮強的太多。施正榮說最艱難的時候是創(chuàng)業(yè)初期員工紛紛離開，債主上門討債的，他覺得非常的窩囊和受人欺負。但苗從軍退伍后從事過六七種行業(yè)，二十余年的摸爬滾打，起起伏伏讓他對于風險和市場本質的認識在行業(yè)內(nèi)不做第二人選，那些從苗連生創(chuàng)業(yè)就跟隨左右，已經(jīng)身居高位的英利高管中，很多人仍然不吃胡蘿卜，就是因為在十幾年前英利公司還在賣菜時，連續(xù)幾個月用胡蘿卜抵一部分的工資。相比起來，施正榮的創(chuàng)業(yè)環(huán)境，實在可以用“天堂”形容。科技英雄、上市公司、中國首富等各種光環(huán)在很短時間接踵而來，作為一個正常人，施正榮需要時間去消化和沉淀。

目前輿論和利潤狀況都較好的英利實際上也有自己的難題，之前引以為傲的垂直整合模式被行業(yè)普遍采用，“熊貓計劃”的成本也偏高，六九硅業(yè)由于多晶硅市場價格急速下滑而處境尷尬，苗連生的憂患意識讓英利幾乎總能避免大的受損，不至傷筋動骨。

與尚德的模式更為相像的是天合光能，高紀凡和施正榮都是推崇打造國際化的公司，都對別人稱其為中國公司感到不滿，但天合的運營幾乎沒有出過大的失誤，而且成本控制也比較好，這證明了國際化路線在中國是行得通的。高紀凡的謹慎和對成本的把控是主要原因。

施正榮的戰(zhàn)略眼光并不只給尚德帶來空中樓閣般的聲名，還有實實在在的好處，當時施正榮力排眾議成立的GSF（Global Sola Fund）為尚德在2010年一季度就獲得投資盈利超2億美元。

而作為一個毛澤東式的理想主義者，對施正榮功過是非的爭議要比業(yè)內(nèi)任何企業(yè)家多得多，如毛一般，他開創(chuàng)了一個時代，讓光伏行業(yè)得以蓬勃發(fā)展，也讓李源潮等目前在中央身居要職的國家領導認識到光伏行業(yè)，有望結束光伏“朝中無人”的局面；如毛一般，他在后續(xù)建設發(fā)展中務實精神不足，將精力放眼于天下而缺乏細節(jié)；現(xiàn)在他也如毛一般走下了神壇，這種轉變實際上對他和尚德來說是件好事情。

無責任猜想：尚德會被收購么？

本月韓國LG與尚德同時發(fā)表聲明，否認之前風傳的LG將收購尚德一事。實際上在2009年就有大量的報道傳言尚德將被收購，后來這些都被事實打敗，現(xiàn)在的施正榮在回應包括尚德破產(chǎn)在內(nèi)的這些傳言時顯得更加淡定。

我們來無責任猜想一下，如果尚德被收購，那么將是哪幾家企業(yè)？收購尚德，首先要具備行業(yè)基礎和對行業(yè)的了解，范圍可以鎖定圈內(nèi)企業(yè)；其次收購尚德能夠協(xié)助其降低成本，提高科技創(chuàng)新，所以最有可能的就是多晶硅企業(yè)，收購尚德后一個強有力的產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈打造完善，屆時的尚德將更加可怕。

滿足這兩個條件的有諸如協(xié)鑫、OCI、REC、Hemlock和Wacker等企業(yè)。但Hemlock和Wacker似乎滿足于在光伏行業(yè)的現(xiàn)狀，因此前三個企業(yè)的可能性最大。當然，筆者認為施正榮是不會將自己的心血出售的，這個行業(yè)的大企業(yè)中，真正功成身退的只有因王漢飛去世心灰意冷的林洋老板陸詠華，其它人又怎么舍得放手一手打造起來的數(shù)百億的產(chǎn)業(yè)和更誘人的前景。

也有傳言，尚德目前的負面消息被有意擴大，也是有意收購尚德的買家刻意炒作，但事實究竟如何，尚不得而知。

買點股票？

中國發(fā)改委能源所所長李俊峰在尚德十周年的會上開玩笑說：“建議大家買點尚德的股票，因為目前包括尚德在內(nèi)的光伏企業(yè)股價已經(jīng)跌至低谷，僅設備和廠房價值就遠超現(xiàn)在的市值。”李俊峰還沒有提及尚德的品牌和渠道建設，這個價值則更不容忽視，即使目前的尚德一瓦的產(chǎn)能都沒有，僅找OEM代工就完全可以做得風生水起。

相信很多投資者都對包括尚德在內(nèi)的幾家光伏大廠的股票頗為心動，因為從長遠角度看，這些大廠在未來的競爭中不存在存活下去的問題，而只要有能力活下去，就同樣有能力迎來這個行業(yè)的大發(fā)展，這是我們?nèi)w光伏人都從不懷疑的事情。只不過現(xiàn)在大家希望盡可能的抄底罷了。

白手起家，上市、擴張，再到經(jīng)歷行業(yè)的起起伏伏，現(xiàn)在尚德年產(chǎn)能2.4GW,每天組件的生產(chǎn)量6MW，相當于2003年全年的產(chǎn)量，無論今后的尚德之路怎樣，施正榮和他的尚德已然成為一段傳奇。版權申明：施正榮——不妥協(xié)的老大，系天晟國際傳媒有限公司旗下Shine《光能》雜志版權所有并授權發(fā)表。

Shi Zhengrong— Uncompromising Leader

At the beginning, I must state in advance that I am not writing a tendentious article on purpose. Maybe this is the first time that my focus is not on a company’s competiveness but on a company leader. But, the truth is that what Shi Zhengrong stands for is far more than just Suntech.

I think many people, just like me, know PV because of Shi Zhengrong. From attention to China wealthiest person in 2005 to curiosity to PV industry and finally a member in PV industry, in this 6 years, many investors and gold digger rushed into it, ups and downs, but Shi Zhengrong have been in the teeth of storm.

Lots of people and companies in PV industry now are new entrant like me. I remember that China woke up in the dream “energy for dollar” in 2006 and began to strike at enterprises with high energy consumption and pollution. The silicon industry, in which I was engaged, came to a standstill because of lack of money to pay for environment protection equipments. Then, 1 tons of Silicon produced roughly sold 1,000 dollars (then the foreign exchange of USD to RMB is about 8.3), and profit was only 300-500 yuan. I cited a sample for you to understand better here: many companies found they had no profit or made a loss after shipment if shipping cost or foreign exchange changed a little. So I was very surprised at the situation that companies shipped the PV modules by air without considering the cost in 2008.

Elimination of high pollution and high energy-consuming industries is the trend. I was also seeking my career transition then. Suntech went public in west Christmas carnival, and Shi Zhengrong became the wealthiest person with 18.6 billion yuan in China. He was familiar with people in the early 2006. After he signed the Bird Nest project in Beijing, media paid more attention to him. I saw that the silicon, 1 dollar/kg in China, was sold to overseas and purified to polysilicon, then we bought back at the price of 100 dollars/kg. This shocked and also hurt me, and meanwhile I saw more reports about Shi Zhengrong and Suntech. Of course, nobody knew polysilicon spot price would rise to nearly 500 dollars/kg in Q3, 2008.

Dazzling Preacher

At that time, public medium always are interested in Shi Zhengrong’s growing process. People are glad to see the success of grassroots. So, Shi Zhengrong, who was poor as a child, studied abroad in youth and established a business in forty, represented the “knowledge changes destiny” and became a typical overseas returnee hero with technology.

Shi Zhengrong made great contribution for China PV industry’s situation currently. At least 70% PV companies followed Suntech and entered into the PV industry. If you think it’s too overstated, you can just count the number of companies that were established or did PV business after 2005.

On the second SNEC, I saw Shi Zhengrong for the first time. Suntech gave great support to it. After the opening ceremony, Shi Zhengrong and several PV specialists were surrounded by lots of media. Then, Shi Zhengrong showed his ability to full extent and Suntech was powerful and prosperous. Even some strong players like Yingli and Trina Solar only is green leaves that set off red flowers.

Destruction Pursues the Great

Shi Zhengrong has always praised himself as big brother in PV industry, and the way he spoke and said seemingly means “If I can't do it, who can?”. For China PV industry, he really contributed too much, which included but more than China’s investment ecstasy simulated by Suntech’s success.

SolarWorld and the United Steelworders launched a variety of anti-dumping activities, especially SolarWorld. Shi Zhengrong went to Europe in 2009, hoping to resolve disputes, and also called for help when United States released 301 Bill.

Chinese always crave for greatness and success. PV companies’ bank credit was considered as bank loan by China companies intentionally and by United States’ companies unintentionally, and United States exaggerated this point in the new anti-dumping investigations. For these complaints, Shi Zhengrong said:”PV industry needs a united market mechanism, including trade dispute settlement mechanism.”

In fact, Suntech is the only company that has a chance to unify the whole China PV industry. The remarks of Shi Zhengrong also revealed that he was committed to cooperate with each other in PV industry. But until now, China P V industry still looks like a castle of sand sculpture, spectacular but vulnerable. Although we cannot blame Suntech, it is a pity after all. The reason is Shi’s character. But if we look more closely, the problem cannot be attributed to Shi and Suntech.

Once I described the PV players as mahjong players, including government, state-owned enterprises, large enterprises and small businesses. In this game, state-owned enterprises’ gambling money is provided by the government and government and large enterprises always send secret messages, so small businesses are in the isolated state, which is a common phenomenon in China. For example, dairy industry was forced to equipment with testing devices, and small companies that never had problem with dairy felled finally.

While almost all of the policies and standards are inclined to large enterprises, so few small businesses are willing to participate in industry associations. In association meeting in China, they were always leaders of several large enterprises that sited on the platform. In EUPVSEC in Hamburg, Germany and SPI in Dallas, USA, a small company showed the surprising low price-$1 and $0.89.However, I found nobody was interested in it, and the overall market price was pulled down.

If PV competition is compared to hunters chasing for deer, Suntech plays a dual role—the most powerful hunter and occasional deer, which once strained the relationship between Suntech and other players.

Deer Hunting Deer

Let us look back at the domestic large manufactures. If they can achieve win-win cooperation, China PV industry’s development will be more successful. After all, nobody is willing to bear the notoriety of “dumping” if he can make more money. However, Suntech failed to rein the powerful players. In other words, the current Suntech is nothing but the biggest fist. Why is it?

After Suntech was listed, a number of technical staff accumulated by Suntech became undoubtedly a gold mine of technician for new PV companies, but only Suntech was not enough to develop the whole gold mine and make them all jewelry. So in a period of time, no matter Suntech’s staff or management officers became the target of headhunter companies.

Yingli, which often compared with Suntech, is different, it is located in the north, in a single big state, and with the level near without competition, many employees reluctance to go abroad to work after they settle down, and the people of the north is relatively complex long for family serious; Jiangsu Province, where Suntech located is prosperous, and the staff is very convenient to other units to work, while southerners are more willing to make money with more effort. More importance is that Yingli is close to the route of state-owned enterprises model, so that gives the Chinese more sense of belonging; Suntech in this respect is tries hard to make international team, better adapt to the characteristics of the high degree of internationalization photovoltaic industry, but it also let employees liquidity also highly "internationalization". A good example to prove that: At the time of the financial crisis and the now in the market when trough, Yingli Shouted "don't payout, no job cuts" slogan, and Suntech is downsizing in disguised form to defuse the crisis.

The executives left or taken by other enterprises from Suntech in these years:
Yang Huaijin, also studied abroad in Australia with Shi and venture together home, later succession took office in Nanjing CLP(the predecessor of China Sunergy),JA Solar，and later appointed as CEO of Hareon Solar, helping Hareon Solar to enter the market successfully.

Zhang Fengming, Ted, the colleagues of Shi in Australia, have left and get into China Sunergy with Yang Huaijin ,working with Zhao Jianhua couple, Zhang Fengming current is the CTO of Tianwei group, and Ted founded Sunrise Global Solar Energy in Taiwan.

Wang Hanfei, Suntech's first professional manager, then Suntech scientific research personnel ready, government relations by Wuxi government support ,former chairman of LiYanRen to do, Wang Hanfei as Shi's assistant, do a lot of work. He invited by Liu Yonghua later, the boss of Solarfun (predecessor of HSOL), left Suntech in the middle of 2004, helped Linyang go public nasdaq in the United States. But he fall sick from overwork and die in July 2008 in his sleep. His death made Lu Yonghua grieved, his mind in the photovoltaic industry is also lower than before, later he transferred all equity twice at low profile.

Shao Huaqian, was secretary of Shi when startup, and do as vice President later, her left making shi rather felt sorry.

Chen Lizhi ,in Suntech five years, later took charge of vice President of United States company, responsible for American business development, lightning left in July this year.

Zhang Yi, Suntech's CFO, left this year.

As for the middle and operation workers, the loss situation is even more serious, that also creates various contradictions though not obvious between Suntech and other enterprises, but has always been there.

Just as the two sides of a coin, the turnover of Suntech's employees are not all come from the soliciting outside.

Shi Zhengrong and the CEO of Trina Solar Gao Jifan both praise the internationalized route, they will often emphasize Suntech or Trina Solar is not only a Chinese company, but should be viewed as an international company (as it does so, the Chinese listed enterprise, the Chinese photovoltaic equity accounts for only of the part, and a small; and to be Australian). They all are addicted to make a international team, so in Trina Solar and Suntech everywhere foreign staff as a management and foreign affairs work.

Shi Zhengrong and Gao Jifan artificial that China's photovoltaic industry every policy implementation and accomplishments adjustment, let the Chinese government attaches importance to photovoltaic industry for energy conservation and emission reduction successfully, China photovoltaic development plan from scratch, up until now the 50GW development goal by 2020.They lobbyed time after time, and invited the government official to visit factory to prove photovoltaic is clean and can help China of industry transformation of new industries. China's photovoltaic industry can start this year; Si and Gao are the biggest heroes.

But the market attitude of Suntech and Trina Solar can be summarized as "attention but not concentrated", their attention on domestic market is much less than overseas market, to market, both of them are tend to go upper line: making good relations with the government, so when there came good policies they could get benefit.

But if want to open international market further, Shi need a much more international team. In the Reuters website's Suntech executives list, CFO David comes from America's BECHTEL company, his last job is in Tetratech company; John Lefebvre took charge of the President of the United States company on September 26, once worked in SolarCity and GE; CBO Andrew Beebe, graduated from the United States, one of the most famous ivy university Dartmouth. The rest executives except Xie Xiaona have Wuxi government background, all come from the international famous companies and the university of new south wales.

A large number of airborne troops brought let Suntech unimpeded in international market, but it has also brought new problems: how to old employees and "airborne" between even-keeled? Shi said: "I will employ Chinese people as I can, but Suntech is facing the customers in European and American market, not China's coal mining area." When he was looking forward to making Suntech internationalization, he seemed to ignore these "coal mine workers" holds the Suntech's scientific research, financial, customers and government relations in every aspect. When understand China, know Chinese management model of "coal mine workers" leaves his post, Suntech's system, concept, easily formed in convey middle vacuum. There is something can be reference, and Suntech this year awarded to laboratory manager equipment Liu Huailin 1 million yuan award, explain he progress of science and technology to the attention, but there's a detail: in order to ensure that the company Liu Huailin product safety, the house was mortgaged to the bank obtain 800,000 yuan loans, research and development work after was able to carry on. To research and development concentration of Shi, why did Liu Huailin not declare the scientific research funds?

Before "dropped forces" is "air force", how to adjust to the mind now become "army", whether have so deep feelings to Suntech is unknown, the senior staff Suntech employed from BP, Siemens, PWC, and other enterprises with fat salary between 2006 and 2007 had already left more than half.

That embodies the contradictory mentality of Shi, on one hand, he hopes Suntech always maintain the explosive type growth, on the other hand also hope the old employees will be able to keep up with his international process, but even Shi himself will make mistakes in management, this problem is not unique to Suntech, but industry development too fast, from dozens of small factory of MW to China's richest man, then to the financial crisis and the 2010 outbreak of the market, and we all didn't realize that serious industry downs, photovoltaic industry trap and opportunities both existed. Senior analyst Doctor Lian Rui from professional analysis said:"The uncertainty of this industry is too big, so everyone should understand us for the deviation of the prediction."Shi also realized the problem, he said to media that he is hunting for a CEO, but this is easier said than done?

Uncompromising Leader

Shi's complex of "boss" has been accepted in the industry, of course, that along the way, only Suntech has the qualification. But he failed to be such a role as godfather, but more like the eldest son Sani who has personality hot and loves the family.

In the difficult process of Suntech going public, state-owned enterprises background overweight listed a big obstacle, for this Shi conflicted with former chairman Li Yanren, finally with the help of Wuxi Government, original shareholders just as LittleSwan dropped out, Li Yanren left, industrial in Wuxi had a bit criticism to this. Though I am not the parties, and have no comment about this, but think over when calm down, if not, could that Suntech become this Suntech today?

Shi Zhengrong warned that the industry will be surplus when it developed fast, most people think he just wanted to scare the competition and no one effusive; At the time that Yingli gave the super-low price of 0,69 yuan, Shi taunted it several times at the meeting before thousands of people, although it is hard to address, and it is said the price just for Proprietary Power, whether the error occurs also needs to be confirmed, but to the identity of Shi, these words just off his bearing.

From years of observation, Shi's character can be summed up as: a straightforward and some reckless, uncompromising idealist.

It is such a character, but also to Shi Zhengrong it has been calling for industry self-regulation, but it should be a handful. He admits: "We must avoid a concept: If the opponents are to death I can live better. This idea is naive, you can not put someone to death now, and the industry has been new entrants come in, my recommendations are: We should rational analysis of industry trends and their competitive advantage. "This should serve as industry arbiter of Suntech, but often dissatisfied with things to see taking up arms after the run ahead, allowing him to four enemies. This succession of industry circulating, such a thing: Shi had intended to elect a new post Energy Association, but it was called the Australian, non-compliance, and finally blocked.

Shi was also seen as the industry's most famous poison one of the tongue and the reason is that: he often said some including market pessimistic expectations and in some of the criticism of the phenomenon, he called that he often announces some immature prophecy. But unfortunately, all these years of history has proved that most of his words are right.

“Photovoltaic industry has bubbles, one is the wealth effect, and the second is the place to stoke the government."All these were put forward in 2007, no one believed.

“No market, how to have the factory!" The local government will question to photovoltaic industry as an important industry.

"Thin film solar is absolutely bubble; we should analysis who hypes film concept? Are there industry leaders and industry experts?" In 2009 when the film made Shi said film factory anger.

"No matter what industry, as long as the Chinese participate into, the production immediately goes up. If not pay attention to brand and business model construction, finally only 'people drink soup, foreigners eating meat'." 2009’s forecast, it is realized now, now and even in the future, the link will maintain at extremely low profit margins.

"The European demand falls," next year, global market will sure photovoltaic surplus." All these words were published in November 2010.

"PV industry still is unformed; you may be someone in the world today, but may be nothing tomorrow."

"The next two years will be sad," we have to get through the winter in two years. "Next year he is expected the solar panels inventory level will be up to 11 GW.

He also has many words that can cause the resonance of the language. Such as "bold" forecast 2011 China market will have 1.5 GW of capacity, "but he also said that I never expected it'd reached 3 GW; Forecast the electricity price is to a dollar per kilowatt hour, and now has become a reality. It has not been validation is he said 2015 China certainly is the world's largest market, the year capacity is 8 GW-10 GW, American has 6 GW or so, and China, U.S. and India will be the biggest photovoltaic markets.

He will say something everyone in the industry say how to spend the crisis, avoid malicious competition, establish industry system, the more he will say some people won't say, such as for domestic policy before was slowly down, some officials and government departments for not, some are lacking in initiative and overcautious enterprises compared the old total, he's a really different number.

As a media person, a bystander, the China brand of Suntech before a few years, the brand marketing can say not be very successful, the excessive apotheosis of Shi makes people dislike this story. People will feel all the apotheosis will unrealistic, compared the commercial unusual talent, we even takes Shi Zhengrong as a technology rich hero. Shi is one businessman who have the idealism color and take the solar industry as own responsibility, and he spares no effort for developing solar industry. (He made great effort for mass media PV-tech application, and did a great contribution), He admitted that he is also confusing, making mistakes, but why packaging himself as a perfect man?

After Yingli become the sponsor of World Cup, Suntech is also the sponsors of Zhufeng and other sports’ brands. Suntech doesn’t see Yingli having a good future. What is more, some writers will see Yingli’s "heroic victory" as a "hollowing out", let a person dumbfounded, although the words are not come from the will of Shi, but it further corrupts Suntech's image, this makes Yingli more implicative, just in the article of a counter that let readers compare the good or bad by itself, so said these words for the reasons that the information of Shi Zhengrong is easy to collect, but can get the detailed information from the low-key Yingling CEO, Miao Liansheng, just the internal personnel can get it.

This case after Zhang Jianmin was appointed for media relations manager become more improved, now of Suntech, is in a more generous eyes to look at interbank event, friction, meanwhile, Suntech also won more respect for the company.

Face to Face with Wrong

At the end of September, the 10 anniversary celebration ceremony of Suntech held, the energetic Shi Zhengrong feel some tired. Structure adjustment, strategic layout and a lot of negative news let him has no time to rest enough. He said: "in the last 10 years we have many auras, a lot of brilliant, because we are the boss, we also pay a lot for the boss’s price, and we also do a lot of exploration, there are success or the failures, for the follows, for the second, the third provides a lot of experience for reference. At the same time we also got a lot of questions, you are the big boss, you should do very well. We sometimes don't necessarily do very well, so the media friends forgive my indulgence." He won the applause, because in the past, there is had never been seen before. To the author's feeling is that he finally from the aura of go out, and given more reflection and summarized. Although his speech often still emphasize Suntech's leadership, but let person have a understanding laugh with bad feeling, if not so, he is not the Shi Zhengrong.

Although Shi admitted to making some mistakes, but some wrong I think cannot be attributed to him, before the news of "cheat donate" event with calm analysis, Suntech's operation if correct still have dubious, but the merchant's investment is always to return, in doing good and pursue maximization benefit when doing good is understandable.

Also let Suntech fell some distressed is terminate the contract with MEMC. All this is the sin of the war. In addition to TRW CEO Gao Jifan in the first half of 2008 is aware with a broken wrist, and give up thousands of millions’ poly project, there are no one fell the financial crisis’s risk. Including Q-cells、CSI and Nanjing CLP enterprises also sign a long contract with polysilicon enterprises. Remove the supply, let Suntech get rid of the shackles of the body in the longer term, when signing the 10 years contract with MEMC supply agreement, also taking the Suntech shares too, this "break up" with each other, on the one hand, it should be MEMC refused to negotiate, on the other hand, Suntech likes to refer the silicon chips parts in order to low down the cost. In 2006 we sign the contract with MEMC; the price of raw materials is cheaper by 20%-30%，but then we see the trend of raw materials in go down, if we put this contract go down, more than 400 million dollars were lost compared the spot price. Because five years ago, we had paid the advance payment 57 million dollars, the other part admitted we pay more than 60 million dollars until the contract ending. Totally we will pay 110 million dollars, and there will be 400 million dollars saved.

Suntech is struggling with a net debt burden of $130 m, the result of its expensive acquisition of wafer producer Rietech Solar in March. Rietech formerly known as Brilliant silicon energy. (wafer provider of Suntech) According to the company planning, total investment in the Rietech Solar plan could hit $1 bn. At present, it will reach a size of 1.23GW of production capacity with monocrystalline and polycrystalline in the first half of 2011, and reach 2.4 GW and 1.2 GW by separately for modules and sections in late 2011, also can say that its own wafer always maintain half of the quantity. Rietech will reach ultimately 3GW of production capacity.

Personally think that Shi actually invest to thin films at fault, After the short-term prospect downturn, he couldn't help developing thin film projects：Have been making thin films all his life, Suntech always what to make a breakthrough, but it accustomed to ‘number one’ be unable to bear technologically backward of father mainstream，from May 2007 to early 2011, Shi waste a great deal of time and resources, the project has eventually abandoned, in having always been a study films, as a scientist and a successful businessman who still loves be called Doctor more convincing to be absolutely unbelievable if that the project's viability can’t be analyzed, this Idealists still carrying the torch for his old occupations, even it still carry some risk. he endanger himself by going to get a gamble as much as possible, “I have been more than fifty years old, What do I dream” as a explorer, Shi said, for avoid unnecessary mistakes and complications for newly-comers, Suntech have still courage to admit their mistakes.

Chinese companies will have to spend some time practicing this and puts the emphasis on the research and development uses 5%-8% of sales incomes, as a result, after five years it appears again probably First Solar who has been approved by the market, while today PV market bear strong survival pressure. iI rest space for research have become smaller and smaller, like First Solar made a sensational product after be drowned themselves in the studies over the last 10 years, nothing can be replicate.

Medias compare often Shi with Yingli CEO Miao Liansheng who is in great contrast to former, it represents the conflict between different thought of Chinese and foreign enterprises. About smooth out the financial crisis, what is most distressing is how predictable all of this was, and how against the market crisis, Miao is by force very more than Shi.

The most difficult moment of the company that is in pioneering initial stage in faces to creditor went to him for the debt, Employees leave the company in succession, Miao was to see him being humiliated and bullied .While early Miao joined the Army, after leaving the army, he worked in at least six to seven types of jobs.

After more than twenty years training, ups and downs, from time to time, understanding about essential risk and market gave him to not be a second option, among the executives who in high class position in Yingli from the beginning of entrepreneurship, many still eat anything but carrot, as the old Yingli made a living by selling vegetables before a decade, part of their pay is taken out in these carrot for several months, Shi’s environment for entrepreneurship with only be described as paradise! ‘Technology heroes’, ‘quoted companies’, ‘the richest man in China’, etc, build such shrines round Shi within minutes of these titles, as a normal, he needs time to digest and accumulate.

The former vertically integrated model can be proud have already been generally adopted by the industry, in fact, Yingli tends more or less to make too much of its own problems, because pandas plans costs high, the principal attacking Fine silicon industry with glide as a result of Polycrystalline prices situation quickness but the consciousness about crises make no exceptions so he can always avoid huge, damaging losses without biting into muscle and bone.

Trina Solar could then looking a lot like Suntech’s models, Gao Jifan and Shi all embrace business goals: to create international brand decoration company! They also frowned on being referred to as ‘China company ’,but from Trina's operation does not seem to have big mistakes, and cost control might be better, so the internationalization route is being proved to be correct by practice to China. The cautious and cost control of Gao are the main reason.

With a strategic vision, not only does Shi give Suntech fame as a mirage, but bring numerous tangible benefits, then Shi overcoming objections to create GSF（Global Sola Fund）, This investment has surpassed US$ 200 million for Suntech while the first quarter of 2010, As the Maoist Idealists ,for the right and wrong merit of Shi Zhengrong there are much more enormous controversy than any enterprise inside the industry, Like Chair Mao, he opened a new epoch to allow PV industry to flourish, and give sense to some people such as Li Yuanchao in important jobs at national governments on PV, the industry have no official support in the expected to end; As Chair Mao, He lacked the pragmatism to follow-up construction, try to channel all energy into the world with the lack of details; now as Chair Mao hi also is stepping down altar, this is a good thing for him and Suntech.

Scenarios of non responsibility: Could Suntech be bought up?

South Korea based LG and Suntech have announced at the same time, deny the rumor that LG will buy Suntech, in fact, There were a huge number of press reports about such this case back to 2009, later that can be killed by the true, However, Now Shi is calmer than the previous special edition when respond these rumors include bankruptcy of Suntech. Image with non responsibility, which companies you supposed if Suntech agreed to a takeover? those would be the first North Korea in Korean currency reform in 17 years/Priority condition is that they would have industrial technology basis and understand The companies within the industry can be targeted in the shooting, so they would be polysilicon manufactures most probably /One way to do this is to just target a subset of those with the disease/We use the term bandwidth to represent such a frequency range

Believe that build the perfect industry chain after purchase with Suntech, then it will become more powerful. it seem those companies most likely to meet these criteria such as GCL OCI、REC、Hemlock and Wacker, etc. as Hemlock and Wacker do not appeared content with the status of PV industry at the moment, it thereby rest the former three most possibly, but personally think that Shi burnt never his own painstaking effort, just as those huge enterprises within the industry faced challenges after their time in the limelight so does the boss of Solarfun Power, Lu Yonghua which heart sank and turned cold with death of Wang Hanhua, how do others say goodbye to Tens of billions of assets they made themselves and more attractive prospects?

Others whispered that the negative news of Suntech were expanded specifically, also be deliberately speculation by the buyers want to acquire Suntech, how fact, be not yet known.

Should buy a few stocks?

In Suntech’s 10th Anniversary Celebrations, “Should buy more stocks of Suntech,” half-joking, said Li Junfeng, Director of the Energy Research institute of the National Development and Reform Commission, because the shares of some PV manufacturers fell at the lowest point includes Suntech, the value of theirs equipments and Plant alones were trading well over share prices at the moment.

No mention has been made of brand and channel of building by Li, as it should be noted these values with the accountability, Even if now without a watts of production capacity, only looks for OEM as an acting labour to produce, the business would little by little wind. Believe several major manufacturers’ stocks as Suntech back to the sales for many investors rather moved, in the long term, as a nuts that does not exist in these giants to survive in the father competition, they are only alive, would also be great developing in industry, our all PV players make never doubt of, if only we want only pick a bottom as possible or maybe “return a salute”.

Nobody gave Shi any money; he is a self-made millionaire, from listed in public to expand production, then has been lumpy for a bunch of reasons within the industry, Suntech has a capacity of 6MW of modules a day, that would have similar results in full financial year of 2003, Shi Zhengrong and his Suntech have already become a legend no matter what is going to happen on the road to the future.

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